

# **Summarized Results of the Public Opinion Survey on the “Public’s View on Current Cross-Strait Relations” (November 26 – November 30, 2024)**

- Nearly 90% of respondents disagreed with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) prolonged military threats, economic coercion, and diplomatic suppression against Taiwan (89.5%), and nearly 85% opposed the CCP’s insistence that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. Furthermore, over 70% of the respondents opposed the CCP’s insistence that cross-Strait communication and negotiations can only be resumed under the “1992 Consensus” based on the “one China principle” (71.1%).
- Nearly 85% of respondents agreed with the government’s position of upholding the Republic of China’s (ROC) constitutional system and maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait (83.8%). Additionally, nearly 75% agreed that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other” (74.1%), and a similar percentage responded that mainland Chinese spouses “should be required” to renounce their PRC citizenships in order to serve as legislators or hold other public offices in Taiwan (74.0%).
- Once again, the majority of respondents (88.9%) supported “maintaining the status quo defined in a broader sense,” and over 85% supported the assertion that Taiwan’s future must be decided by its 23 million people (86.7%).

## **I. Survey Background and Methods**

In order to understand the views of the Taiwanese people on issues related to cross-Strait relations, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) commissioned the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University to conduct a telephone survey of adults in Taiwan aged 20 and over from November 26 to November 30, 2024. A total of 1,071 valid samples were obtained, with a sampling error of  $\pm 2.99\%$  at a 95% level of confidence.

## **II. Major Findings**

### **(1) Views on mainland China's recent actions towards Taiwan**

Nearly 90% of respondents disapproved of the CCP's prolonged military threats, economic coercion, and diplomatic suppression against Taiwan (89.5%), while nearly 85% opposed the CCP's insistence that the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair and demand for other countries to adhere to the "one China principle" (84.9%). Over 80% of respondents did not endorse the "one country, two systems" model proposed by the CCP, which views Taiwan as a local government and special administrative region under its rule, and leaves no room for the existence of the ROC (86.7%). Additionally, over 70% disagreed with the CCP's insistence that cross-Strait communication and negotiations can only be resumed under the "1992 Consensus" based on the "one China principle" (71.1%).

### **(2) Views on the government's cross-Strait policies**

Over 85% of respondents supported the assertion that Taiwan's future, and the development of cross-Strait relations must be decided by its 23 million people (86.7%). Nearly 85% of respondents support the government's commitment to upholding the ROC's constitutional system and maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait (83.8%). Additionally, nearly 75% agreed that "the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to the other" (74.1%). Furthermore, a similar percentage agreed that since our current laws explicitly prohibit individuals with dual nationality from holding public offices to avoid issues of dual allegiance, mainland Chinese spouses should be required to renounce their PRC citizenships in order to serve as legislators or hold other public offices in Taiwan (74.0%).

### **(3) Views on cross-Strait exchanges**

Over 65% of the respondents indicated that current cross-Strait relations are more tense compared to those in the past (66.6%). Regarding cross-Strait exchanges, nearly 50% of respondents indicated that they believe "national sovereignty" (48.4%) is more important than "economic benefits" (41.2%).

Furthermore, 38.9% of respondents indicated that they perceive the current pace of cross-Strait exchanges to be “just right,” which is comparatively higher than those who indicated that they perceive the pace to be “too slow” (36.4%) and “too fast” (7.3%).

#### **(4) Views on unification and independence**

An overwhelming majority of respondents (88.9%) supported “maintaining the status quo defined in a broader sense” (including “maintaining the status quo and deciding on independence or unification later,” “maintaining the status quo and moving towards unification later,” “maintaining the status quo and moving towards independence later,” and “maintaining the status quo indefinitely”). Among the six possible positions, “maintaining the status quo indefinitely” enjoyed the highest level of support (36.9%), followed by “maintaining the status quo and deciding on independence or unification later” (26.2%) and “maintaining the status quo and moving towards independence later” (21.5%). Less than 10% of the respondents supported “maintaining the status quo and moving towards unification later,” “declaring unification as soon as possible” or “declaring independence as soon as possible” (4.3%, 1.8%, and 4.8%, respectively).

#### **(5) Views on mainland China’s attitude towards our government and people**

The percentage of respondents that indicated that the mainland Chinese government’s attitude towards our government is “unfriendly” (73.2%) is higher than the percentage that indicated it is “friendly” (12.5%). Regarding the mainland Chinese government’s attitude towards the Taiwanese people, 55.6% of respondents indicate that it is unfriendly, higher than those who indicated that it is “friendly” (32.0%).